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Abstract: As the debate about the need to clarify the content of the human right to science 
intensifies, this article assesses opportunities for opening a scholarly and policy dialogue 
on fair and equitable benefit-sharing between international human rights and biodiversity 
lawyers. To that end, the article contrasts the emerging conceptualizations of the right to 
science in the context of international cultural rights and of fair and equitable benefit-sharing 
under international biodiversity law. It then critically assesses the potential for  
cross-fertilization with specific regard to: the sharing of scientific information and 
promotion of scientific cooperation, the transfer of technology, and the protection and 
valorization of traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples and local communities. While 
acknowledging that both the right to science and fair and equitable benefit-sharing are far 
from being fully understood or operationalized, the article argues that developments in 
international biodiversity law concerning the latter may provide insights into how a vague 
and optimistic concept can (and when it cannot) lead to tangible outcomes, rather than 
remaining merely rhetorical. 
Keywords: right to science; benefit-sharing; equity; international law; biodiversity;  
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1. Introduction 
The likely first appearance in international law of the concept of fair and equitable benefit-sharing 
is in the 1946 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, where the right of everyone to “share in 
scientific advancement and its benefits” is recognized1. What the human right to science means, 
however, remains to be clarified. The role of fair and equitable benefit-sharing in this context equally 
awaits elucidation, particularly against the backdrop of increasing references to benefit-sharing in a 
plethora of other international legal materials, notably in relation to bio-prospecting2 and the human 
rights of indigenous peoples3. As the debate about the need to clarify the content of the human right to 
science intensifies, it appears opportune to examine to what extent fair and equitable benefit-sharing 
has been interpreted and refined in different areas of international law. In particular, this article argues 
that there is significant scope for cross-fertilization between the right to science and international 
biodiversity law to that end. 
As the right to science has been mainly investigated from the viewpoint of health law, the article 
will start by providing an overview of the debates on the role of science in international environmental 
and human rights law. Following an explanation of why possible cross-fertilization with international 
biodiversity law is worth pursuing, the article will discuss the emerging conceptualizations of the right 
to science in the context of international cultural rights and of fair and equitable benefit-sharing in the 
context of international biodiversity law. The central section of the paper will critically assess the potential 
for cross-fertilization with specific regard to: the sharing of scientific information and promotion of 
scientific cooperation, the transfer of technology, and the protection and valorization of traditional 
knowledge of indigenous peoples and local communities. The paper will conclude by highlighting the 
opportunities of opening a scholarly and policy debate on fair and equitable benefit-sharing at the 
crossroads of the human right to science and international biodiversity law. While acknowledging that 
both the right to science and fair and equitable benefit-sharing are far from being fully understood or 
operationalized, international legal developments concerning the latter may provide insights into how a 
                                                        
1  Article 27(1) (emphasis added). 
2  An “international regime” on access and benefit-sharing has been identified as comprising: the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing 
of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGR), and the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and 
Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization (CBD Decision X/1 (2010), preambular para. 6). 
To these instruments one should add the World Health Organization (WHO) Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) 
Framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits (effective 24 May 2011) 
WHO Doc WHA64.5. 
3  e.g., 1989 International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention (Indigenous and Tribal Peoples) No 169, Article 15(2); 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname (judgment on preliminary objections, 
merits, reparations and costs), 28 November 2007, para. 138; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v. Kenya, Comm. No. 276/2003 (25 November 2009) para. 274; Expert Mechanism, Follow-up report 
on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-making with a focus on extractive industries (2012) UN 
Doc A/HRC/21/52. 
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vague and optimistic concept can (and when it cannot) lead to tangible outcomes, rather than 
remaining merely rhetorical. 
2. Science in International Environmental and Human Rights Law 
Science is a predominant theme in international environmental law and governance. Science-based 
decision-making is key to the implementation of international environmental obligations and the pursuit 
of sustainable development4. Several challenges, however, remain in strengthening the science-policy 
interface [1]. The precautionary principle/approach [2,3]5 and the complexities related to the governance 
of science and technology have come to the forefront, sometimes in heated debates. They have been 
addressed in a burgeoning area of scholarship focused on risk and regulation, including at the 
intersection of international environmental and health law [4,5]. In addition, the sharing of environmental 
information, the fostering of scientific cooperation, as well as science-related capacity-building and 
technology transfer, are defining, inter-linked features of international environmental treaties [6,7]. 
They are often, however, not fully implemented. 
Understanding the role of science from an international law viewpoint, however, needs to factor in 
several challenges, such as common assumptions that scientific advances are necessarily beneficial6 or 
that scientific knowledge is objective. Instead, science is socially construed: although in principle it is 
expected to be disinterested, based on peer review and on a culture of sharing among scientists, in 
practice it may be marked by competitiveness, secrecy and interests, with the growth of interdisciplinarity 
destabilizing the checks of established disciplinary standards and community of peers ([8], pp. 1738–40). 
Against this background, the law has been called upon to enquire into, rather than take at face value, 
scientific expert judgment, because this involves significant value choices, ranging from the selection 
and framing of research questions to the selection and use of evidence ([8], pp. 1742–43). Facing 
irredeemable uncertainty [9], the law has further been called upon to give priority to inclusiveness and 
responsiveness to societal needs, vulnerability, and the consideration of distributive consequences [10]. 
In particular, the law is increasingly expected to focus on the need for scientific propositions to fit into 
social practices and local meaning [11], in order to increase the chances of adherence to the law but also 
to avoid negative, if not potentially catastrophic, consequences. 
The power dynamics at play in science have also been increasingly revealed ([12]; [13], p. 210). 
Impacts of neoliberalism on scientific research practices have been detected, such as the diminution of 
public funding, the narrowing of scientific agendas on the needs of commercial actors, and the 
intensification of intellectual property rights impeding the production and dissemination of scientific 
findings [14]. These and other evolving features of scientific endeavors have critical, but often 
overlooked, implications for legal distinctions between commercial and non-commercial research, for 
                                                        
4  World Summit on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) Outcome Document, The Future We Want, (2012) UN Doc 
A/RES/66/288, paras. 48, 76(g), 85(k), 88(d), 168, 204, 220, 271–272 and 276. 
5  Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) UN Doc A/CNF.151/26, vol. 1, Annex I, Principle 15; 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), 
Judgement (20 April 2010), para. 164. 
6  Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications, 2009, paras. 13(c) and 16. 
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instance. Even more fundamentally, the definition of science itself may lead to exclusion and 
marginalization. It has been convincingly argued that the self-connotation of Western European science 
(as captured in peer-reviewed academic publications) has contributed to the denigration and 
marginalization of the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples and local communities (as captured 
in storytelling), although both are social constructs and in fact “modern” science can be historically 
seen as an increasingly standardized form of local knowledge [13]. 
Turning to an international human rights law perspective, it has been noted that “science is rarely 
addressed through a human right lens” ([15], p. 1). Yet the human right to science is not a new  
right [16]. It was proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and arguably there was 
broad consensus for its inclusion ([17], p. 29). It is seen as an autonomous right that is worthy of 
protection for its contribution to the continuous raising of the material and spiritual standards of living 
of all members of society, both for individual emancipation and collective economic and social 
progress ([18], chap. 5)7. As such, it may contribute to the enjoyment of other human rights such as the 
rights to food, culture, health and housing [15–17]. In addition, the right to science contributes to 
“protect and enable each person to develop his or her capacities for education and learning, to form 
enduring relationships with others, to take equal part in political, social and cultural life and to work 
without fear of discrimination” ([18], chap. 5). Schabas argued that the right to science is both a civil 
and political right (in particular with regard to access to information) and a social, cultural and 
economic one ([17], p. 299). Other scholars and recent international discussions on the right to science, 
however, tend to place this right in the less settled realm of cultural rights ([19], p. 160; [20], p. 42). 
As the right to science has been incorporated in several treaties including the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)8, its legally binding force does not seem to be 
under discussion [16]. Nevertheless, most human rights experts and practitioners are “oblivious to its 
existence” ([15], p. 1), because its content still has to be better specified [15,16]9. This is demonstrated 
by the fact that the right to science is generally overlooked by international bodies and by states in 
their reports ([16]; [17], p. 273). In addition, of course “the lack of a consensus as to what the right 
entails makes implementation far less likely” ([15], p. 1). Against this backdrop, it has also been 
argued that the “precious little authority” that has been accrued so far to clarify the content of the right 
to science presents an opportunity to develop it in evolutionary ways that take into account “the realities 
of the human condition at the dawn of the 21st century” ([17], p. 274). 
                                                        
7  The latter aspect is reflected in the inclusion of the right to science in the 1966 Declaration on Social Progress and 
Development, (1969) General Assembly resolution 2542 (XXIV), article 13(a), which reads: “Equitable sharing of 
scientific and technological advances by developed and developing countries, and a steady increase in the use of 
science and technology for the benefit of the social development of society.” 
8  Article 15 (in slightly different wording than in the Universal Declaration). See also Charter of the Organization of 
American States, Article 38; American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man Article XIII and Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 14; 
and Arab Charter on Human Rights, Article 42. 
9  Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights: the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and 
its applications (2012) UN Doc A/HRC/20/26 (hereinafter, Shaheed’s report). 
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Times seem ripe for such an endeavor. In 2011 the UN Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural 
rights Farida Shaheed called attention to the fact that the scope, normative content and obligations of 
States with regard to the human right to science remain underdeveloped. She suggested that the right to 
science encompasses: the right to access the benefits of science by everyone without discrimination; 
the opportunity for all to contribute to scientific research; the obligation to protect all persons against 
negative consequences of scientific research or its applications on their food, health, security and 
environment; and the obligation to ensure that priorities for scientific research focus on key issues for 
the most vulnerable10. Breaking down the right to science into separate, but interlinked, components is 
a helpful step towards a more systematic discussion of its content. However, each of these components, 
including the way in which they are framed and their feasibility, raise questions that necessitate critical 
discussion, as will be explained below. Significantly for present purposes, the Rapporteur underscored 
specifically the need for further clarification of the modalities and role of benefit-sharing vis-à-vis 
technology transfer11. Whether and how benefit-sharing is part of, or can otherwise be related to, the 
four components of the right to science (and in particular, the right to access benefits), however, is 
obscured by the lack of consistent use of terminology in the report. Arising conceptual questions will 
form an important part of the present investigation. 
The Special Rapporteur concluded by recommending that the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights develop a general comment on the human right to science12. In November 2013 the 
Committee agreed to carry out background research on the right to science, which may lead to a future 
formal process for the development of a general comment in that regard13. It is, therefore, of the 
essence to increase scholarly efforts to contribute to this debate, including by making references to 
legal developments, challenges and lessons learnt in relevant areas of international law. In this connection, 
the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) certainly deserves the central attention it has received in 
policy14 ([18], chap. 5) and academic work on the right to science [17–21]. Several scholarly efforts 
have already been devoted to the identification of ways to reconcile IPRs and human rights that are of 
relevance, particularly at the interface with health [22], including in the context of international 
biodiversity law [23]. Although IPRs-related problems and possible solutions are well researched, 
however, there is a clear tendency in the progressive development of international biodiversity law to 
avoid addressing IPR issues [24]. This is one of the reasons why this article will not enter into this 
specific debate. The other, more principled reason is that the concerns about IPRs may have obscured 
other critical legal questions that may be related to the right to science. On such other questions, the 
progressive development and implementation of international biodiversity law may provide useful 
insights, notably in relation to innovative forms of international cooperation, and to the protection of 
                                                        
10  Shaheed’s report, paras. 1, 25, 30–43. 
11  Shaheed’s report, paras. 66–69. 
12  Shaheed’s report, para. 75a–b, based on Article 15 of the ICESCR. 
13  Report of the Fiftieth and Fifty-First Sessions of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ECOSOC) 
(2014) UN Doc E/2014/22 E/C.12/2013/3, para. 74. 
14  Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights: patent policy and the right to science and culture (2015) 
UN Doc A/70/279. Note also that the first general discussion in ECOSOC on the right to science focused on IPRs, at its 
24th Session (13 November–1 December 2000). 
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lands and traditional lifestyles of indigenous peoples and local communities that hold traditional 
knowledge. It is on these less studied aspects that this article will focus. It is argued that the notion of 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing, as developed under international biodiversity law, provides a 
conceptual bridge and concrete lessons learnt to initiate a broader reflection on the interactions and 
tensions between human rights and the environment [25–27] in relation to science. 
3. The Relevance of Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing as Developed under International 
Biodiversity Law 
Before identifying promising areas for cross-fertilization between international human rights and 
international biodiversity law, it is necessary to explain why this is considered a worthwhile path for 
academic investigation and policy debate. This premise is particularly needed as international biodiversity 
law does not include human rights terminology ([28], p. 617) and often relies on heavily qualified 
language that may have human rights implications15. An obvious example concerns the reference to 
“indigenous and local communities” in the text of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and 
its Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-sharing. Until late 2014, CBD parties 
could not find consensus on utilizing the more human rights-cognizant expression “indigenous peoples”, 
despite repeated recommendations to do so from the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues16. In 
addition, when consensus was found on changing the terminology to “indigenous peoples and local 
communities”, it came with explicit cautions aimed at emptying the decision of any evolutive interpretative 
value17. Another example can be found in the continued opposition of some CBD parties to making 
reference to the right to “prior informed consent” of indigenous peoples18 ([29], pp. 148–55) and tepid 
language merely “noting”19 the relevance of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples20. 
There is thus no denying that the CBD has provided a forum in which the reticence on human rights 
questions of certain States has emerged. What is less well-known, however, is that notwithstanding 
these political difficulties, significant conceptual and normative clarification has been achieved under 
the CBD on the linkage between human rights and the environment [30]. This may be partly due to the 
procedural openness to inputs from indigenous peoples and local communities in its negotiations21. As 
                                                        
15  This is the notable case of CBD Article 8(j). 
16  e.g., Report of the Tenth Session of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (2011) UN Doc. E/2011/ 
43-E/C.19/2011/14, paras. 26–27; and CBD Decision XI/14 G (2012), para. 2. 
17  CBD Decision XII/12F (2014). 
18  Resulting in the adoption of the ambiguous expression “prior informed consent or approval and involvement” in the 
Nagoya Protocol, Articles 6–7. 
19  Nagoya Protocol, preambular recital 26. 
20  UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNGA Res 61/295, 13 September 2007). 
21  Under the CBD Working Group on Article 8(j) (traditional knowledge), the fullest possible participation of indigenous 
and local communities is ensured in all Working Group meetings, including in contact groups, by welcoming 
community representatives as Friends of the Co-Chairs, Friends of the Bureau and Co-Chairs of contact groups; 
without prejudice to the applicable rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties establishing that representatives 
duly nominated by parties are to conduct the business of CBD meetings so that any text proposal by indigenous and 
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a result, this normative activity has contributed to clarify the implications of CBD obligations for the 
protection of the human rights of indigenous peoples in the context of the technicalities of 
environmental decision-making and management processes. This can be evidenced in the reliance of 
relevant human rights bodies on some CBD decision, for instance22. It can also be argued that in some 
cases, outcomes of CBD negotiations have gone beyond settled international human rights law: the 
recognition of the interests of non-indigenous local communities under the CBD and the Nagoya 
Protocol, for instance, contrasts with international human rights law ([29], pp. 82–384), where the 
status of local communities remains underdeveloped ([31]; [32], pp. 319, 324–25). 
In light of the somewhat paradoxical relationship between international biodiversity law and 
international human rights law, it is proposed here to explore opportunities for mutual supportiveness [33] 
between international human rights and international biodiversity law. This effort is grounded in an 
interpretative approach based on systemic integration [34]23, to identify when and how relevant and 
applicable rules of the CBD, the Nagoya Protocol and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture can support the interpretation of the right to science as enshrined 
in the ICESCR, and vice versa. With specific regard to the CBD, it should also be added that, as a 
framework convention with quite open-ended provisions, it may also be helpful from an interpretative 
perspective to rely on the decisions of the CBD Conference of the Parties (COP) [35] as subsequent 
practice establishing agreement on the interpretation24 of relevant CBD rules. 
In particular, the CBD has brought about significant normative development of fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing, gradually building consensus ([36], p. 260) among 196 Parties25  across different 
sectors (bioprospecting, natural resource management, and related use of traditional knowledge). 
Taken together and contrasted with other developments in international law [37]26, they arguably lead 
to a conceptualization of fair and equitable benefit-sharing as the concerted and dialogic process in 
identifying and allocating economic and non-economic benefits among State and non-State actors, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
local communities’ representatives must be supported by at least one party. Report of the Seventh meeting of the Ad 
Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions (2011) UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/11/7, para. 20. 
22  Reliance on: CBD Article 8(j) in ‘Review of Developments pertaining to the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples’ (2001) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2001/2, para. 15; CBD 
Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines on socio-cultural and environmental impact assessments, CBD Decision VII/16C 
(2004), Annex, as a pre-condition for benefit-sharing by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname (Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), Judgment of 12 August 2008, para. 41 and fn 23; by the Special Rapporteur 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous People’ Rights on the situation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people (2010) UN Doc A/HRC/15/37, para. 73, and by the 
Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2010) UN Doc A/HRC/15/35, para. 37, which also referred to 
the CBD work programme on protected areas, CBD Decision VII/28 (2004). 
23  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Article 31(3)(c). 
24  VCLT, Art. 31(3)(b); First and Second Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in relation to 
Treaty Interpretation, (2013) UN Doc A/Cn.4/660 and (2014) UN Doc A/CN.4/671. 
25  The whole international community is party to the CBD, with the notable exception of the United States. 
26  Namely, CBD, Nagoya Protocol and International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGR); but also taking into account the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and ILO Convention No. 169. 
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with an emphasis on the vulnerable. In other words, benefit-sharing differs from unidirectional (likely  
top-down) flows of benefits, and rather aims at developing a common understanding of what benefits 
are at stake, how they should be shared and with whom. It appears to entail an ongoing, possibly  
long-term, process, rather than a one-off exercise, of good-faith engagement among different actors. 
Accordingly, benefit-sharing appears geared towards building consensus27 and laying the foundation 
for a partnership among different actors28. This understanding of sharing also relates to theories on 
fairness and equity in international law: namely, as the commitment to engage in a discourse where no 
participant can make claims that automatically prevail over the claims made by other participants, and 
where inequalities in the substantive outcome of the discourse are only justifiable if they provide 
advantages to all participants29. 
Reliance on this concept of fair and equitable benefit-sharing is far from problem-free, however. 
Anecdotal empirical evidence indicates that in practice benefit-sharing rarely achieves its stated 
objectives, and may actually end up working against its purposes, due to power asymmetries in the 
relations it applies to. Furthermore, risks attached to different forms of benefits to be shared have not 
been fully or systematically analyzed. Little attention has so far been paid to the costs and losses for 
communities that may be associated with certain benefits ([40], p. 158). Concerns have been raised 
that benefit-sharing could be misused to renegotiate human rights or put a price-tag on them ([41],  
p. 847). In addition, the question of who are the beneficiaries remains one fraught with conceptual and 
practical difficulties [37]. With specific regard to science, furthermore, access to information may 
create loopholes for the implementation of benefit-sharing obligations ([29], pp. 179–91). No systematic 
reflection has focused on the opportunities and limitations of international law to prevent, address and 
remedy the injustices that may be brought about in the name of benefit-sharing [42–44]. Nevertheless, 
what has been learnt so far from such difficulties in implementing fair and equitable benefit-sharing 
under international biodiversity law may potentially be of great use in thinking about challenges in the 
practical application of the human right to science. A dialogue with international human rights lawyers 
concerned with the right to science may not only help to test the usefulness of the conceptual advances 
on fair and equitable benefit-sharing in international biodiversity law, but also to critically assess 
oversights and new initiatives in realizing fairness and equity through benefit-sharing under international 
law more generally. 
  
                                                        
27  Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Report to the Human Rights Council (2009) UN Doc 
A/HRC/12/34, para. 53; Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Study on Extractive Industries and 
Indigenous Peoples (2013) UN Doc A/HRC/24/41, para. 88. 
28  e.g., ‘Review of Developments pertaining to the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples’ (2001) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2001/2, para. 19; and Report of the High-level Task 
Force on the Implementation of the Right to Development on its Second Meeting (2005) UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/ 
WG.18/TF/3, para. 82. 
29  This argument draws by analogy on the application of theories on fairness and equity in international law to the 
international investment law concept of fair and equitable treatment by Klager [38] drawing on Franck [39]. 
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4. Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing and the Right to Science 
It is one of the main contentions of this article that all four dimensions of the right to science in the 
context of international cultural rights can provide opportunities for cross-fertilization with the 
conceptualization of fair and equitable benefit-sharing in the context of international biodiversity law 
proposed above. A key argument in this respect is that the concept of “sharing” benefits as developed 
under international biodiversity law can serve to interpret the right to science in its dimension of access 
to the benefits of science as a tool for cross-cultural inclusion and empowerment of different actors.  
The other dimensions of the right to science, in turn, appear helpful in interpreting fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing under international biodiversity law and identify guarantees to protect the vulnerable. 
In either case, contrasting the conceptual elements of the right to science and of fair and equitable  
benefit-sharing serves to bring into the spotlight problematic legal issues that deserve further reflection. 
4.1. Access to or Sharing of Benefits? 
Of the four components of the right to science identified by the UN Special Rapporteur in the field 
of cultural rights, the most obvious connection with international biodiversity law can be found 
between fair and equitable benefit-sharing and the right to access the benefits of science by everyone 
without discrimination. While the Universal Declaration made reference to sharing in the benefits, 
however, successive treaty formulations differ on this specific point. In particular, the ICESCR makes 
reference to the “right to enjoy benefits”. The UN Special Rapporteur’s 2011 report uses “to benefit”, 
to “enjoy benefits”, “to participate in the benefits”, “to share benefits” and to have “access to benefits”. 
Besides terminological inconsistencies, access to resources, rather than access to benefits, is often 
associated with fair and equitable benefit-sharing under international biodiversity law, with such 
access arguably representing a precondition for, or the result of, benefit-sharing30. The relationship 
between the two concepts is far from clear ([29], pp. 49–52)31. 
The legal scholarship on the right to science, however, has put forward arguments that “sharing” 
benefits is a key conceptual element to be clarified in this context. Mancisidor emphasized the concept 
of “sharing” benefits, arguably having the same meaning as to “participate”32, indicates action or  
agency [16]. The traveaux preparatoires of the Universal Declaration seem to suggest that “sharing” 
was used to pointing to the universality of the right to science—in other words, to the idea that even if 
not everyone may play an active part in scientific advancements, all persons should indisputably be 
able to participate in the benefits derived from it ([15], pp. 5–6). Thus, Mancisidor argued that the 
understanding of the wording used in the Universal Declaration should color the interpretation of the 
different wording in the ICESCR in full [16]. In addition, a recent effort under UNESCO to clarify the 
                                                        
30  CBD Article 1; Nagoya Protocol Article 1; ITPGR Article 1. 
31  See notably Nagoya Protocol preambular para. 8. 
32  This reflects interpretative practice under the ILO Convention No 169, where a textual reference to participate in benefits 
has been understood as benefit-sharing: e.g., Observation (ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations)—adopted 2009, published 99th International Labour Conference session (2010), para. 11. 
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principle of benefit-sharing makes reference to the right to science under the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the ICESCR33. 
As opposed to access, therefore, which may convey a passive role in benefitting from scientific 
advancements, sharing in benefits rather conveys the idea of active participation in the identification of 
benefits, sharing modalities and beneficiaries. This understanding would be in line with the proposed 
conceptualization of benefit-sharing under international biodiversity law as a concerted and dialogic 
process aimed at building a fair and equitable partnership among different actors that may have 
different worldviews on what science is and what its benefits are. It may thus also serve to recognize 
different forms of knowledge as science that can produce benefits, as well as address power dynamics 
that are affected or engendered by science. For these reasons, it is argued here that the first dimension 
of the right to science should be interpreted consistently as “sharing the benefits of science”, in line 
with the formulation in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, rather than as a right to access 
them. This interpretation based on mutual supportiveness between international human rights law and 
international biodiversity law can also serve to unveil the interlinkages between the four components 
of the right to science, as discussed below. 
In addition, in the context of academic reflection on the right to science, it has been argued that the 
term “benefit” should be understood as “material benefits that every person should be able to enjoy in 
everyday life directly enhancing human capabilities, improving living standards and enabling people to 
participate more actively in the life of their community” ([15], p. 9). The UN Special Rapporteur in the 
field of cultural rights has more succinctly emphasized that benefits should be contributions to human 
well-being34. It remains to be clarified, however, whether an emphasis on “material” benefits may 
result in privileging applied research rather than more abstract research or social sciences35, importance 
of which for the more effective implementation of international biodiversity law36 , but also for 
effective risk assessment and management [45], is increasingly understood. More generally, it remains 
to be elucidated whether this understanding of benefits is adequate to factor in different, culturally 
dependent understandings of scientific progress and different forms of knowledge as science37. The 
menu of monetary and non-monetary benefits to be shared under international biodiversity law may 
provide useful food for thought in that regard ([29], pp. 133–35)38. The above questions could be 
looked at as part of the concerted, dialogic process of identifying benefits to be shared, taking into 
account different beneficiaries’ needs, values and priorities ([46], pp. 29–30), with a view to selecting 
the combination of benefits that lays the foundation for a fair and equitable partnership among them. 
The interplay and tensions between economic and non-economic benefits and their respective 
                                                        
33  International Bioethics Committee of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Draft 
Report on the Principle of the Sharing of Benefits (2015) UN Doc SHS/YES/IBC-22/15/3. 
34  Shaheed’s report, para. 22. 
35  I am grateful to Margherita Brunori for drawing my attention to this point. 
36  e.g., Draft report of the nineteenth meeting of the CBD Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological 
Advice (2014) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/19/L.1. 
37  I am grateful to Saskia Vermeylen for drawing my attention to this point. 
38  Nagoya Protocol Annex. Compare with Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, adopted by UNESCO’s 
General Conference on 19 October 2005, Article 15. 
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contributions to human wellbeing, however, remain to be studied more systematically under 
international biodiversity law ([47], p. 32). This is a key aspect that deserves further clarification also 
with a view to contributing to the practical application of the right to science. 
Another aspect that deserves more reflection is the contrast between the universality of the right to 
science, and the focus of benefit-sharing on indigenous peoples and local communities as traditional 
knowledge holders or ecosystem stewards under international biodiversity law. This could be considered 
a reflection of the specific subject-matter scope of the relevant international biodiversity treaties, but 
could also raise concerns when compared to the broader approach to the protection of traditional 
knowledge under the human right to culture39. The argument to be explored in a mutually supportive 
fashion is thus whether sharing benefits under international biodiversity law implies more than a mere 
logic of exchange. In other words, what are the benefit-sharing opportunities to recognize, reward, 
promote and renew/strengthen the conditions for the production of global benefits (such as scientific 
advancements for global food security and global health, or ecosystem services) that derive from the 
use of traditional knowledge and ecosystem stewardship [37]? Admittedly, international biodiversity 
rules on benefit-sharing have mostly developed with regard to the sharing of benefits among those 
directly participating in the triggering activity, whereas concerns about the underlying production of 
global benefits figure less prominently in the treaty objective 40  or in few, very open-ended 
obligations41. Exploring a mutually supportive interpretation of fair and equitable benefit-sharing in 
light of the human right to science may serve to bring into sharper focus the challenges related to  
the production of global benefits that may derive from specific benefit-sharing obligations under 
international biodiversity law. 
4.2. The Other Three Dimensions of the Right to Science 
The other dimensions of the right to science find reflection in international biodiversity law to 
differing extents. Nevertheless, all of them appear helpful in interpreting fair and equitable benefit-sharing 
under international biodiversity law in a mutually supportive way with international human rights  
law more broadly. 
The second element of the right to science (the opportunity for all to contribute to scientific 
research) finds reflection in international biodiversity law in as far as the sharing of non-monetary 
benefits is expected to contribute to building/enhancing the capacities of beneficiaries to conduct  
bio-based scientific research on their own. This is the case of collaboration in scientific research and 
development programmes, of cooperation in education and training, and of admittance to databases42. 
The feasibility of these non-monetary benefits, however, in the context of funding-constrained and 
competitive research remains to be proven. In addition, non-monetary benefits that can be essential to 
enhance the ability of beneficiaries to share in monetary benefits in the long term43, may create 
                                                        
39  CESCR, General Comment No 21 (2009) UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 para. 37. 
40  CBD Article 1, ITPGR Article 1, and Nagoya Protocol Article 1. 
41  Nagoya Protocol Article 8(b). 
42  Nagoya Protocol Annex, paras. 2(b), (d)–(e). 
43  e.g., Nagoya Protocol preambular recitals 5, 7 and 14. 
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dependency on external, ready-made solutions that may not fit particular circumstances, or may allow 
for the exertion of undue influence by donor countries ([29], pp. 313, 331). Gathering and assessing 
evidence in these regards could be of use in better understanding challenges in the practical implementation 
of this dimension of the right to science. 
In addition, Plomer’s proposed interpretation of the right to science inspired by capabilities theory 
can provide particularly fertile ground for cross-fertilization. In broad approximation, capabilities 
theory sees justice as the distribution of opportunities for individuals and groups to freely pursue their 
chosen way of life and wellbeing [48]. In the context of the right to science, capabilities theory 
arguably emphasizes the need to support the individual’s ability for self-development through the 
transformative power of knowledge, and to create and maintain enabling social, legal and economic 
institutions to support the advancement and diffusion of knowledge ([18], chap. 2). On the one hand, 
the individual dimension points to possible tensions between the universality of the right to science and 
the sharing of global benefits in international biodiversity law, discussed in the previous section. On 
the other hand, the institutional aspect can provide a useful lens to analyze, in international biodiversity 
law, the interplay between non-monetary benefit-sharing and State obligations to provide capacity 
building44 and funding45 ([29], pp. 327–29) to various actors, as well as the impact of donors’ vested 
interests in that context [49]. 
The third element of the right to science (the obligation to protect all persons against negative 
consequences of scientific research or its applications on their food, health, security and environment) 
is not easily found in international biodiversity law. It has been argued, for instance, that under the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety the “sharing of the benefits arising from biosafety-related research 
implies the sharing of the results of research aiming to avoid or minimize the risks of modern 
biotechnology” ([47], p. 23). In addition, under the CBD, technology to be transferred needs to be 
“relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity or make use of genetic 
resources and...not cause significant damage to the environment”46. But generally attention is rather 
paid to positive, rather then negative, aspects of scientific advancements under international biodiversity 
law. Accordingly, under the Nagoya Protocol links are established between fair and equitable  
benefit-sharing and the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity ([29], pp. 54–55, 193, 207)47, 
food security48, and health49 that could potentially contribute to maximize opportunities for bio-based 
scientific research to positively contribute to food, health and environmental objectives of interest to 
all. A mutually supportive interpretation, therefore, could be relied upon to assess the need to prevent 
or minimize possible negative impacts of scientific research in the realm of bioprospecting and 
                                                        
44  For instance, the governing body of the Nagoya Protocol: see the Strategic Framework for Capacity-Building and 
Development to Support the Effective Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in 
Decision NP-1/8 (2014), Annex. 
45  Nagoya Protocol Article 25. 
46  CBD Article 16(1). 
47  Nagoya Protocol Articles 1 and 9–10. 
48  ITPGR, preamble and Article 1; Nagoya Protocol preamble and Article 8(c). 
49  Nagoya Protocol, preamble and Article 8b(b). 
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biotechnology as part of the concerted and dialogic process identifying benefits, sharing modalities and 
beneficiaries under international biodiversity law. 
The fourth element of the right to science (the obligation to ensure that priorities for scientific 
research focus on key issues for the most vulnerable) resonates, to some extent, with the non-monetary 
benefit identified by the Nagoya Protocol as “research directed towards priority needs, such as health 
and food security”50. A mutually supportive interpretation of the whole construct of the Protocol in 
light of this element of the right to science could serve to inject in the concerted and dialogic process 
of identifying benefits that respond to the needs of the vulnerable. This concern is not extraneous to 
international biodiversity law, but it remains under-developed compared to the identification of 
immediate benefits reaching those actively involved in triggering activities. 
Overall, paying attention to the different components of the human right to science can help bring 
into the spotlight opportunities offered in international biodiversity law for all to share in the benefits 
from, and contribute to, scientific research, as well as to focus research priorities on the most vulnerable. 
A mutually supportive interpretation could prevent the sidelining of these concerns when a logic of 
exchange may prevail in concrete benefit-sharing negotiations. In addition, the different components of 
the right to science help better understand which guarantees need to be coupled with fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing under international biodiversity law, such as non-discrimination, transparency in 
decision-making, and focus on the vulnerable ([15], p. 31). 
5. Specific Areas for Cross-Fertilization 
Three areas can now be singled out for further exploring opportunities for cross-fertilization 
between the right to science and fair and equitable benefit-sharing under international biodiversity law: 
information-sharing and scientific cooperation; technology transfer; and the sharing of benefits arising 
from the use of the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples and local communities. 
5.1. Information-Sharing and Scientific Cooperation as Benefit-Sharing 
International biodiversity law could contribute to the realization of the human right to science 
through two forms of non-monetary benefit-sharing: the sharing of scientific information and scientific 
cooperation. As to the former, the Nagoya Protocol includes among possible benefits the sharing of 
research and development results, and admittance to databases51. Furthermore, it can be expected that 
the possible development under the Nagoya Protocol of a global benefits-sharing mechanism52 could 
lead to the multilateral-level linking of public and private databases to facilitate the sharing of relevant 
scientific information dispersed across the globe ([50], pp. 225–26). Overall, this could contribute to 
the practical realization of the right to science in two dimensions: the sharing of research findings is a 
way to share benefits from science and to increase the chances for all to contribute to further scientific 
research. A key issue in this connection, however, concerns the distinction between obligations to 
                                                        
50  Nagoya Protocol Annex, para. 2(m). 
51  Nagoya Protocol Annex, para. 2(a) and (e). 
52  Nagoya Protocol Article 10. 
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share raw scientific data, whose contribution to the right to science rests on available capacity to use 
such data, as opposed to obligations to share analysis of data53. 
The practice of information-sharing as a form of benefit-sharing in international biodiversity law 
may be difficult to assess, as it is generally left to bilateral agreements among public and private 
parties54. The global mechanisms that were set in place to that end, such as the CBD Clearinghouse55, 
have not led to remarkable results: the Clearinghouse is considered “underutilized” and “developed 
rather haphazardly, without a clear mandate” ([51], p. 471; [52]). It thus remains to be verified whether 
in practice the implementation of information-sharing obligations under international biodiversity law 
can contribute to the realization of the right to science. Initiatives in addressing implementation 
challenges may, however, already provide useful lessons of potential relevance also to the practical 
application of the right to science. In addition, more proactive and institutionalized approaches to 
information-sharing may be emerging under international biodiversity law. Under the International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, a Global Information System is being 
launched as a web-based entry point to information and knowledge that is specifically geared towards 
strengthening the capacity for the conservation, management and utilization plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture56. For present purposes, it is worth highlighting that what is envisaged is a 
combination of elements to actively pursue not only the sharing of scientific information (by promoting 
and facilitating interoperability among existing systems, and creating a mechanism to assess progress 
and monitor effectiveness) but also opportunities for all to contribute to scientific research (by 
enhancing opportunities for collaboration, and providing capacity development and technology transfer)57. 
As to scientific cooperation, the CBD provides for participation in biotechnological research58.  
The Nagoya Protocol includes among possible benefits collaboration, cooperation and contribution in 
scientific research and development programmes, participation in product development, collaboration, 
cooperation and contribution in education, and admittance to research facilities59. Similarly to what 
observed above about sharing scientific information, however, it may be difficult to assess to what 
extent these obligations effectively contribute to the realization of the right to science, as they are 
generally left to bilateral agreements among public and private parties. In addition, a specific  
provision of the Nagoya Protocol is devoted to research related to biodiversity conservation, including 
non-commercial research, through national law-making. It establishes a general obligation for State 
parties to “create conditions” favorable to research contributing to conservation and sustainable use 
when developing and implementing national frameworks60. It specifies that this should be implemented 
particularly when such research is carried out in developing countries. The provision appears to 
                                                        
53  Note, for instance, Antarctic Treaty, Article III. I am grateful to Daniela Diz for drawing my attention to this point. 
54  It is left to “mutually agreed terms”: CBD Articles 15(7) and 19(2); Nagoya Protocol Article 5. 
55  CBD Article 18(3) and Cartagena Protocol Article 20. The ABS Clearing House (Nagoya Protocol Article 14) is more 
concerned with sharing information about implementation, than about scientific information as such. 
56  ITPGR Articles 13(2)(a) and 17. 
57  ITPGR resolution 3/2015 (IT/GB-6/15/Res 3). 
58  CBD Articles 1, 15(5), 16 and 19. 
59  Nagoya Protocol Annex, para. 2(b)–(e). 
60  Nagoya Protocol Article 8(a). 
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complement an often-forgotten CBD obligation for Parties to “endeavor to develop and carry out 
scientific research based on genetic resources provided by other Parties with the full participation of, 
and where possible in, such Parties”61. The lessons learnt in the implementation of these provisions 
could contribute to understanding practical barriers to the realization of the right to science in its 
dimension related to the opportunity for all to contribute to scientific research, in particular challenges 
in reaching those that need the most support to participate in scientific research. 
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, instead, includes 
scientific cooperation among the benefits to be shared through its Multilateral System 62 . Its  
Benefit-sharing Fund finances activities that are designed to support farmers in developing countries in 
conserving crop diversity in their fields, also with a view to assisting farmers and breeders globally in 
adapting crops to changing needs and demands. In particular, it supports innovative partnerships 
between research centers, farmers, civil society, and public/private sector leaders at all levels, and 
projects with the potential to be scaled up across agro-ecological zones, ensuring best use of current 
scientific data [53]. The Fund operates through a project-based approach63, which has been criticized, 
however, for not taking sufficiently into account the unequal capacities of different actors to develop 
eligible project proposals [54]. This example points to concrete modalities and practical difficulties 
under international biodiversity law to move towards a proactive and brokering role for international 
institutions in supporting scientific cooperation, which could contribute to the realization of the right to 
science in its dimension of opportunity for all to contribute to scientific research. 
As opposed to general international obligations related to sharing scientific information and supporting 
scientific cooperation under other international environmental agreements, the framing of these 
obligations as fair and equitable benefit-sharing under international biodiversity law may arguably 
subject them to a concerted and dialogic process for identifying benefits, beneficiaries and sharing 
modalities. Such a process can arguably allow for the consideration of all four dimensions of the right 
to science, on the basis of a mutually supportive interpretation of benefit-sharing obligations and the 
right to science. The benefit-sharing process can thus serve to critically assess whether information-sharing 
and scientific cooperation lead to non-discriminatory results, prioritize the needs of the vulnerable, and 
factor in the need to protect against negative consequences of scientific research. 
5.2. Technology Transfer as Benefit-Sharing 
In Shaheed’s preliminary discussion of the content of the right to science, her reflections focused on 
the role of technology transfer as benefit-sharing ([15], pp. 4, 30), making explicit reference to some 
international biodiversity treaties that prominently include technology transfer as a form of  
                                                        
61  CBD Article 15(6). 
62  ITPGR Article 13(2)(c). 
63  The priorities, eligibility criteria and operational procedures were adopted as annexes 1–3 to the Funding Strategy in 
2007. See Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Report of the Governing Body of the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (FAO, 2007). 
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benefit-sharing64. Interestingly, however, Shaheed also hinted at technology transfer obligations under 
other multilateral environmental agreements, such as on climate change, which are not framed as  
benefit-sharing65. A similar approach can be found also in the international process on a human right to 
international solidarity 66  and the long-standing efforts to clarify the controversial right to 
development67. In light of the proposed conceptualization of fair and equitable benefit-sharing under 
international biodiversity law, it could be argued that the intuition behind this approach is to subject 
the interpretation and implementation of technology transfer obligations to a concerted and dialogic 
process for the identification of the type of technology to be transferred, the modalities of such transfer 
and the beneficiaries with a view to building fair and equitable partnerships. 
With regard to the right to science, Shaheed pointed to an “implied obligation for developing 
countries [to prioritize] the development, import and dissemination of simple and inexpensive technologies 
that can improve the life of marginalized populations rather than innovations that disproportionately 
favor educated and economically affluent individuals and regions”. She then pointed to a “corresponding 
obligation for industrialized countries to comply with their international legal obligations through 
provisions of direct aid, as well as development of international collaborative models of research and 
development for the benefit of developing countries and their populations”68. These recommendations, 
however, do not refer to the need to take into account the preferences of intended beneficiaries and local 
contextual elements in assessing which technologies may be usefully and equitably shared, as was 
cautioned by former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food De Schutter ([55], p. 348). In addition, 
reference could have been made to the need, at the time of the decision to transfer technology, to 
convey relevant information specifically to those that are going to manage its risks and/or be exposed 
to them (workers, civil society, and communities) [56]. 
While in principle framing technology transfer as fair and equitable benefit-sharing may contribute 
to address these concerns as part of a concerted and dialogic process of sharing, there is limited 
practice under international biodiversity law to assess whether this is indeed a distinct and viable 
approach to realize the right to science69. As for other forms of benefit-sharing, this is generally left to 
bilateral agreements among public and private parties. Nonetheless, an interesting example of bottom-up, 
pragmatic support for the realization of the sharing of scientific benefits and the opportunity to participate 
in scientific research may be found under the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture. A platform for the co-development and transfer of technologies has brought together a 
network of public and private institutions that collaborate in delivering a combination of information 
                                                        
64  CBD Articles 1 and 16 and ITPGR Article 13(2)(b). Reference could also have been made to Nagoya Protocol Article 1 
and Annex. 
65  Shaheed’s Report, fn 76. 
66  Report of the Independent Expert on Human Rights and International Solidarity to the General Assembly (2013) UN 
Doc A/68/176, para. 27(d). 
67  In its so-called ‘third dimension’: Report of the High-level Task Force on the Implementation of the Right to Development 
on its Sixth Session: Right to Development Criteria and Operational Sub-criteria (2010) UN Doc A/HRC/15/WG.2/ 
TF/2/Add.2, criteria 3(b)(i)–(ii). 
68  Shaheed’s report, para. 68. 
69  e.g., CBD technology transfer work programme, Decision VII/29 (2004), paras. 3.2.8 and 3.2.9. 
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sharing, capacity building and technology co-development and transfer with facilitated access to 
genetic material. The initiative is meant to complement the Benefit-sharing Fund of the Treaty, by 
identifying real needs of targeted beneficiaries (small farmers and their communities), assembling 
technology packets that could include training and other activities instrumental to fostering technology 
absorption capacity, as well as developing standardized conditions (such as humanitarian clauses)70. 
While the platform was launched as a voluntary initiative of certain governments and stakeholders, it is 
gradually been integrated into the multilateral benefit-sharing structure of the Treaty71. 
Similarly to the argument developed above in relation to scientific information-sharing and 
cooperation, a mutually supportive interpretation of the right to science and technology transfer 
obligations framed as benefit-sharing could serve to integrate in a concerted and dialogic process for 
identifying the technology to be transferred, transfer modalities and beneficiaries a consideration of all 
four dimensions of the right to science. This can then aim to critically assess whether technology 
transfer leads to non-discriminatory results, prioritizes the needs of the vulnerable, and factors in the 
need to protect against negative consequences. 
5.3. Sharing Benefits from the Use of Traditional Knowledge 
Probably one of the most challenging aspects of the right to science concerns the traditional 
knowledge of indigenous peoples and local communities. It has not figured prominently, however, in 
the debate on the right to science. Special Rapporteur Shaheed merely referred to the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples with regard to the need for “adopting measures to ensure the right 
of indigenous peoples to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over 
traditional knowledge”72. In his academic commentary on the right to science, Schabas was more 
explicit about the need to prohibit by law the use of traditional knowledge without sharing ownership, 
control, use and benefits with traditional knowledge holders ([17], p. 294). This seems more in line 
with the human rights of indigenous peoples, in the context of which the need to obtain the prior 
informed consent of73, and to share benefits with74, traditional knowledge holders has been identified, 
but not elaborated upon75. 
Against this background, the evolution of international biodiversity law on fair and equitable  
benefit-sharing from the use of traditional knowledge may provide a fertile ground for cross-fertilization 
with the right to science on several accounts. First, international biodiversity law may provide lessons 
                                                        
70 FAO, Reports of Meetings on the Establishment of a Platform for the Co-Development and Transfer of Technology 
(2013), FAO Doc IT/GB-5/13/Inf.16. 
71 ITPGR Resolution 4/2015 (2015) FAO Doc IT/GB-6/15/Res 4. 
72  Report on patent policy and the right to science and culture (n 14 above), paras. 54–55. 
73  CESCR, General Comment No 21 (2009) UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/21, para. 37. 
74  UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Review of World Bank operational policies (2013) UN Doc E/C.19/ 
2013/15, para. 27; Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ‘Promotion and protection of the rights of 
indigenous peoples with respect to their cultural heritage’ (2015) UN Doc A/HRC/EMRIP/2015/2. 
75  In comparison to the Nagoya Protocol, neither the ILO Convention No 169 or UNDRIP link benefit-sharing and traditional 
knowledge. CESCR, General Comment No 21 (2009) UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 para. 37, refers to prior informed consent, 
but not benefit-sharing, with regard to traditional knowledge. 
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learnt in recognizing traditional knowledge on an equal basis with other systems of knowledge. 
Second, the concepts of prior informed consent and fair and equitable benefit-sharing have  
been elaborated upon under international biodiversity law. These clarifications may be helpful to 
understand how the benefits arising from scientific advances based on traditional knowledge can be 
shared with indigenous peoples and local communities in the areas of nature conservation, natural 
resource management and bio-based research. Third, prior informed consent and fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing also provide a bridge between the right to science and business responsibility to respect 
indigenous peoples’ rights. 
5.3.1. Questions of Recognition 
A preliminary question is whether the right to science is based on a post-colonial connotation of 
“modern” science in opposition to, or to the exclusion of, traditional knowledge [57,58]. The CBD 
establishes a qualified obligation to respect, preserve and maintain knowledge embodying traditional 
lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity76. Soft-law guidance adopted 
under the CBD underscores that to respect traditional knowledge requires valuing equally with, and 
complementary to, scientific knowledge, in order to promote the full respect for the cultural and intellectual 
heritage of indigenous and local communities relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity77. On this basis, current processes under the CBD are exploring concrete ways to integrate 
traditional knowledge in the scientific and technological discussions on implementation of the 
Convention at the multilateral level 78 . Questions have been raised, however, as to whether the 
representatives of indigenous peoples and local communities have sufficient procedural access to the 
relevant decision-making processes ([59], p. 4). In addition, the Intergovernmental Platform on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) [60] is developing approaches and participatory 
processes to integrate traditional knowledge into regional and thematic assessments of biodiversity and 
ecosystem services79. While the approaches are still under development, there are indications that they 
will be based on the respect for indigenous and local knowledge systems’ validation procedures, as 
well as provide for prior informed consent, benefit-sharing, and recognition of rights and attribution80. 
Even if traditional knowledge is recognized as a form of science, however, such recognition risks 
bringing about an idealized understanding of it as fixed in time. This may impose unfair burdens on 
traditional knowledge holders, constraining the further development of their knowledge systems in 
light of changed circumstances, including changes to traditional life styles within which traditional 
knowledge is rooted ([13], p. 207). In effect, several of the possible benefits to be shared under the 
                                                        
76  CBD Article 8(j). 
77  Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct on Respect for the Cultural and Intellectual Heritage of Indigenous and Local 
Communities, CBD Decision X/42 (2010), Annex, preamble (hereinafter, CBD Code of Ethical Conduct). 
78  e.g., Draft report of the nineteenth meeting of the CBD Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological 
Advice (2014) UN Doc UNEP/ CBD/ SBSTTA/19/L.1. 
79  IPBES, Update on Deliverable 1(c) Indigenous and Local Knowledge Procedures and Approaches, (2014) 
IPBES/3/INF/2, Annex II. 
80  See also the Knowledge, Information and Data Plan and draft strategy in IPBES, Update on Deliverable 1(d) Data and 
Knowledge (2014) IPBES/3/INF/3, Annex I, para. 9 
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CBD are aimed at allowing communities to continue to provide global benefits by preserving and 
protecting the communal way of life that develops and maintains traditional knowledge and ecosystem 
stewardship81. Non-monetary benefits to be shared to this end comprise the legal recognition of 
community-based natural resource management82 and the incorporation of traditional knowledge in 
environmental impact assessments83 and in natural resource management planning84. These can be 
ways for traditional knowledge holders to be formally recognized as partners in natural resource 
management85. Another key benefit specific to the agricultural sector is the continuation of traditional 
uses and exchanges of seeds86, which is considered essential for farmers to continue to significantly 
contribute to global food security ([47], pp. 36–37). In addition, though, non-monetary benefits comprise 
different forms of support to enable communities to navigate increasingly complex and ever-changing 
technical, policy and legal landscapes (from the global to the local level) that affect their traditional 
way of life. Such benefits include scientific and technical information and know-how, direct investment 
opportunities, facilitated access to markets, and support for the diversification of income-generating 
opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses87. It is difficult to assess, however, whether these 
provisions are making a difference in practice, in the absence of systematic reporting and assessment 
of compliance under the Convention on Biological Diversity. Nevertheless, these guidelines may 
provide a detailed interpretative basis upon which to raise issues about the protection of the traditional 
knowledge of indigenous peoples under relevant international human rights monitoring processes. 
5.3.2. Prior Informed Consent and Benefit-Sharing Standards 
The CBD qualified obligation to promote the wider application of traditional knowledge with the 
approval and involvement88 of knowledge holders and encourage equitable benefit-sharing89 from the 
                                                        
81  CBD Secretariat, “How Tasks 7,10 and 12 Could Best Contribute to Work under the Convention and to the Nagoya 
Protocol” (2013) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG8J/8/4/Rev.2, para. 23. 
82  CBD expanded work programme on forest biodiversity, CBD Decision VI/22 (2002), para. 31 and programme element 
1; CBD work programme on protected areas  (n 22 above), paras. 2(1)(3)–2(1)(5). 
83  Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n 22 above), para. 56. 
84  Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines on the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, CBD Decision VII/12 (2004), Annex 
II, operational guidelines to Principle 4; CBD expanded work programme on forest biodiversity (n 85 above), para. 13. 
85  This seems confirmed in proposed guidelines for the development of mechanisms, legislation or other appropriate 
initiatives to ensure the prior informed consent or approval and involvement of indigenous peoples and local communities 
for accessing their knowledge, innovations and practices, the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use 
and application of such knowledge, innovations and practices and for reporting and preventing unauthorized access to 
such knowledge, innovations and practices (2015) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/13/3, Recommendation 9/1, para. 25(a) 
(hereinafter, CBD Draft Guidelines). 
86  Nagoya Protocol Article 12(4); ITPGR Article 9(3). 
87  Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines (n 87 above), rationale to Principle 4; and CBD Guidelines on Tourism and 
Biodiversity, CBD Decision V/25 (2000), paras. 22–23 and 43. 
88  Note varying terminology in that respect: CBD Article 8(j) refers to “approval and involvement”; the CBD Work 
Programme of Work on the implementation of Article 8(j) (traditional knowledge) and related provisions, CBD 
Decision V/16 (2000) para. 4 to “prior informed consent or prior informed approval”; the Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n 22 
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use of this knowledge has been interpreted through a series of soft-law decisions to apply more broadly 
to communities’ customary sustainable use of biological resources in accordance with traditional cultural 
practices that are compatible with conservation or sustainable use requirements90. It has also been 
developed into a binding obligation under the Nagoya Protocol in relation to traditional knowledge 
“associated with genetic resources” in the specific context of research and development ([29],  
pp. 126–30; [47], pp. 34–39)91. Because of the political emphasis placed on biopiracy as the unlawful 
use of traditional knowledge for commercial innovation purposes, however, limited attention has been 
so far paid under international biodiversity law to prior informed consent and benefit-sharing from the 
non-commercial use of traditional knowledge, including in the context of pure research aimed at 
providing global benefits (such as advancing biodiversity and climate science)92. 
Although the CBD text itself does not distinguish between commercial and other utilization of 
traditional knowledge, other international instruments that intend to build on international biodiversity 
law have done so93. A systematic reading of the Nagoya Protocol ([29], pp. 179–84)94, would point to 
an international obligation to seek prior informed consent and share (arguably non-monetary) benefits 
arising from non-commercial research on traditional knowledge, including when the research is meant 
to contribute to the global goal of conserving biodiversity. The extreme caution with which the issue of 
benefit-sharing from non-commercial research has been treated by CBD parties on other occasions, 
however, may imply that this is debatable. Such caution is particularly palpable in the voluntary “code 
of ethical conduct” for research and exchange of information concerning traditional knowledge 
adopted under the CBD95. In effect, CBD parties may be more concerned about encouraging use of 
traditional knowledge in non-commercial research, on the assumption that it leads to participatory and 
joint research for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use as a form of non-monetary  
benefit-sharing 96 . Traditional knowledge holders, in turn, may wish to be involved in scientific 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
above), para. 53, to “prior informed consent” and the Nagoya Protocol Articles 6–7 to “prior informed consent or 
approval and involvement”. 
89  “Subject to its national legislation” and “as far as possible and as appropriate”: CBD Article 8(j). 
90  CBD Article 10(c), which has then been reflected in all the thematic areas of work of the Convention: e.g., CBD 
revised work programme on inland water biodiversity, Decision VII/4 (2004) Annex, para. 9; CBD work programme 
on island biodiversity, Decision VIII/1 (2009) Annex, Target 9.2; and CBD work programme on drylands, Decision 
VIII/2 (2006), Target 9.2. 
91  Nagoya Protocol Articles 5(5) and 7; ITPGR Articles 9(2)(a) and 13(3). 
92  Consider, for instance, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change” (2007), at 138 and 673; and UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005), Article 17. 
93  See, for instance, how international finance institutions have reflected international biodiversity law on this point in 
their standards: International Finance Corporation (IFC), Performance Standard 8 (2012), para. 16. 
94  Nagoya Protocol Article 8(a), read with Article 5 and Annex, and Articles 16–17. 
95  CBD Code of Ethical Conduct, paras. 14 and 1, which indicate that the code is not intended to “interpret the obligations 
of the CBD”. 
96  CBD Draft Guidelines include section foreseeing that community protocols may include special measures for 
encouraging non-commercial research, participatory research and joint research for conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity: para. 24. 
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research, both because of the recognition of their contribution to scientific advancements and as a way 
to increase their voice in decision-making. However, a variety of risks need to be duly taken into 
account. Indigenous peoples may lose control of their knowledge once it is shared and becomes subject 
to laws other than their customary rules [61]. Or the use of traditional knowledge may fail to have 
indigenous peoples’ values reflected and protected in research findings or management measures 
developed on the basis of traditional knowledge ([61], p. 539). 
Whether it is for commercial or non-commercial purposes, the use of traditional knowledge raises 
specific challenges with regard to the notion of prior informed consent and benefit-sharing, which have 
been addressed in CBD guidelines, and can be related to different dimensions of the right to science. 
With regard to the first dimension of the right to science (sharing benefits from scientific advances), 
CBD parties agreed that indigenous peoples and local communities ought to receive fair and equitable 
benefits for their contribution to activities by academic institutions and other potential stakeholders in 
research projects related to traditional knowledge associated with biodiversity that are proposed to take 
place on, or that are likely to impact on, sacred sites and lands and waters traditionally occupied or 
used by communities97. In addition, guidelines currently under development in the CBD framework, 
which are of relevance for the interpretation also of the Nagoya Protocol98, arguably apply both the use 
of traditional knowledge in indigenous lands and remotely. They indicate that research results should 
be shared in understandable and culturally appropriate formats, as a way of recognizing and strengthening 
the contribution of indigenous peoples and local communities to the conservation and sustainable use 
of biodiversity, including by supporting the intergenerational transmission of traditional knowledge, 
with a view to building enduring relationships, promoting intercultural exchanges, knowledge and 
technology transfer, synergies, complementarity and respect99. 
In relation to the second component of the right to science (opportunity for all to contribute to 
scientific research), the CBD code of ethical conduct underscores that indigenous peoples and local 
communities should have the opportunity to actively participate in the research that affects them or 
which makes use of their knowledge. The code does not go as far as indicating in that context whether 
traditional knowledge holders should also contribute to set priorities for scientific research with a focus 
on key issues for the most vulnerable (the fourth component of the right to science), although it 
indicates that indigenous peoples and local communities should decide their own research priorities 
and conduct their own research100. Acknowledging a significant layer of complexity, the code of 
ethical conduct also highlights the connection between the protection of traditional knowledge and 
communities’ land tenure, continued access to natural resources and relationship with the environment101. 
This is certainly an aspect that has so far been overshadowed by the perception that IPRs are the 
greatest threat to traditional knowledge. The linkage between fair and equitable benefit-sharing and land 
tenure as an essential pre-condition for the protection and preservation of traditional knowledge, 
                                                        
97  CBD Code of Ethical Conduct, para. 14. 
98  CBD Decision XII/12D (2014) preambular para. 4 and para. 2, refers to “use and applications” of traditional 
knowledge, based on a mandate in CBD Decision V/16 (2000), Task 7. 
99  CBD Draft Guidelines, para. 25(c). 
100  CBD Code of Ethical Conduct, para. 25. See also CESCR, General Comment No 21, paras. 36 and 50(c). 
101  CBD Code of Ethical Conduct, paras. 17–18 and 15. 
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remains to be teased out in the context of growing international guidance on responsible agricultural 
investment102, and international human rights and investment disputes concerning land [62]. 
Another key challenge is to ensure indigenous peoples’ continued opportunities to govern and 
steward traditional knowledge, in line with their customary laws and the web of relationships defining 
who may use it, when and how ([61], p. 534). In this connection, CBD guidelines under development 
are set to provide important clarifications on prior informed consent. They suggest that it should be 
understood as a continual process building mutually beneficial, ongoing arrangements between users 
of traditional knowledge and indigenous peoples and local communities103. In addition, the negotiations 
of these guidelines have provided an opportunity for indigenous peoples' representatives to explain that 
reference to “free” prior informed consent, in line with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, serves to underscore that the consent process is “self-directed by the community” from whom 
the consent is sought, so that communities control the context of decision-making104. The need to give 
due importance to indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ customary decision-making processes is 
also highlighted in relation to seeking consent sufficiently in advance of any authorization to access 
traditional knowledge105. Furthermore, the proposed notion of “free” prior informed consent may serve 
to take a broader and more nuanced approach to possible forms of pressure placed on communities, 
such as expectations or timelines that are externally imposed106. This would appear to bring about a 
layer of protection that is additional to the western notion of consent as merely devoid of more obvious 
forms of pressure such as coercion and intimidation. Indigenous peoples’ representatives also proposed 
clarifying that granting prior informed consent to users of traditional knowledge does not imply a 
transfer of ownership over the knowledge but only allow temporary use107. In line with usual practice 
under the CBD, no explicit mention was made of IPRs in this context (or can any reference be found in 
the draft guidelines). 
While prior informed consent has attracted the lion’s share of attention in international human rights 
law, the specifications that can be found in CBD soft law may provide a significant level of normative 
detail that can support actors approaching indigenous peoples with a view to laying the basis for a fair 
and equitable scientific partnership. What remains to be further clarified, however, is the interaction 
between prior informed consent and fair and equitable benefit-sharing. In practice, benefit-sharing may 
be offered in exchange for obtaining consent108. In principle, benefit-sharing should be seen as an 
                                                        
102  FAO, 2012 Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the 
Context of National Food Security (VGGT), Article 8.6; and Committee on Food Security, Principles for Responsible 
Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems (2014), para. 23, iv. 
103  CBD Draft Guidelines, para. 6. 
104  CBD Draft Guidelines, para. 14. 
105  CBD Draft Guidelines, para. 15. 
106  CBD Draft Guidelines, para. 14. 
107  CBD Draft Guidelines, para. 9. 
108  Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Kichwa Indigenous Communitiy of Sarayaku v Ecuador (Merits and 
reparations, Judgment of 27 June 2012), para. 194. 
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embodiment of the conditions for granting prior informed consent109, as well as of the safeguards 
against the disrespect of such consent after it is granted110. Exploring this area of cross-fertilization between 
the right to science and international biodiversity law may thus provide fertile ground to critically 
explore how prior informed consent and fair and equitable benefit-sharing can provide a way for 
indigenous peoples and local communities to be fully recognized as co-creators of knowledge. Through 
that, it may be possible to explore to what extent communities can be empowered to effectively influence 
decision-making that is underpinned by the science base they contributed to create. 
5.3.3. Business Responsibility to Respect Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
The crucial and problematic role of business in the production and sharing of scientific knowledge 
was acknowledged by Special Rapporteur Shaheed [16] 111 . Reference was made 112  to possible 
synergies with the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights113. The UN Framework is the first 
intergovernmental endorsement that private companies are expected to respect internationally 
recognized human rights over and above what is required of them by national laws and independently 
of States’ abilities and willingness to fulfill their human rights obligations. Shaheed underscored the 
need to further develop voluntary codes of conduct by companies, and the role of States in “setting out 
clearly the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction 
respect human rights throughout their operations, including abroad” 114 . The implications of this 
approach in terms of extending human rights obligations extraterritorially have attracted scholars’ 
attention115. A new international legally binding instruments on business enterprises with respect to 
human rights is currently the object of an intergovernmental process116. 
Against this background, another area for cross-fertilization with the right to science, in as far as 
traditional knowledge is concerned, arises from the integration of prior informed consent and fair and 
                                                        
109  So benefit-sharing could contribute to culturally appropriate and effective consultations: Expert Mechanism on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ‘Follow-up Report on Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision-making 
with a Focus on Extractive Industries’ (2012) UN Doc A/HRC/21/55, para. 43. 
110  Benefit-sharing would thus provide concrete expression of the accord granted by indigenous peoples on the basis of 
their own understandings and preferences: Study on Extractive Industries and Indigenous Peoples (n 27 above), para. 43. 
111  Shaheed’s Report paras. 70–73. 
112  Shaheed’s Report, paras 70–71 and fn 79. 
113  Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie. ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business 
and Human Rights’ (2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/35, paras. 25 and 58 (the Human Rights Council recognized the need to 
operationalize the framework through Resolution 8/7 of 2008, para. 2). 
114  IFC, Performance Standard 7 (2012), paras. 18–20; FAO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 
the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the World Bank, Principles for Responsible Agricultural 
Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources (PRAI), principle 6; UN Global Compact Office, 
‘Business Reference Guide to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2013), at 76–77; Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Indigenous People’ Rights (2010) UN Doc A/HRC/15/37, paras. 73–75. 
115  e.g., Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural  
Rights (2011). 
116  Human Rights Council, Resolution 26/9 of 26 June 2014. 
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equitable benefit-sharing in the due diligence process for business to respect the human rights of 
indigenous peoples. This interpretation was put forward by James Anaya, the former UN rapporteur on 
indigenous peoples’ rights, with particular reference to extractive industries and indigenous peoples’ 
rights to lands and natural resources117. While Anaya did not provide further clarification with regard 
to business responsibility to respect indigenous peoples’ rights over traditional knowledge, relevant 
CBD guidelines that already address business actors among other addressees118 could be relied upon to 
that end. In fact, other international standards for business already incorporate a requirement of 
informed, good-faith consultation and fair and equitable benefit-sharing from the commercial use of 
traditional knowledge for commercial purposes, which is based on international biodiversity law119. 
In line with the mutually supportive interpretation of fair and equitable benefit-sharing and the right 
to science outlined above, a link could be established between companies’ due diligence processes and 
the concerted and dialogic process for sharing benefits in order to establish a fair and equitable 
partnership. This could allow for the consideration by business entities of questions related to the 
identification of culturally appropriate and socially acceptable benefits arising from the use of traditional 
knowledge, the risk of discriminatory results, the prioritization of the needs of the vulnerable, and the 
need to protect against negative consequences of scientific research. Such considerations could be 
incorporated at different stages of companies’ due diligence: those internal to companies, such as risk 
assessments, and external ones such as consultation and redress mechanisms. This argument could also 
provide a basis for a broader reflection on whether fair and equitable benefit-sharing may be a helpful 
component of due diligence for business responsibility to respect the right to science more generally. 
6. Conclusions 
There are numerous reasons to start a scholarly and policy debate on fair and equitable benefit-sharing 
at the crossroads of the human right to science and international biodiversity law. These reasons are 
both of a principled and practical nature. 
From an interpretative perspective, the key argument put forward in this article is that the concept 
of fair and equitable sharing benefits as developed under international biodiversity law can serve to 
interpret the right to science as a tool for cross-cultural inclusion and empowerment of different actors. 
In particular, the first dimension of the right to science should be interpreted consistently as “sharing 
the benefits of science”, in line with the formulation in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
rather than as a right to access benefits. Such an interpretation serves to underscore the need for a 
concerted and dialogic process for identifying benefits, beneficiaries and sharing modalities geared 
towards fair and equitable partnerships among State and non-State actors that contribute to scientific 
                                                        
117  For instance, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous People’ Rights (2010) UN Doc A/HRC/15/37, paras. 73–80; 
and Report of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights (2009) UN Doc A/HRC/12/34, paras. 48 and 53. 
118  For instance, the Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct, Annex, para. 14, addresses “other potential stakeholders in 
research projects related to traditional knowledge associated with biodiversity that are proposed to take place on, or 
that are likely to impact on, sacred sites and lands and waters traditionally occupied or used by communities.” Other 
CBD guidelines are similarly addressed to a variety of stakeholders, including also the private sector implicitly or explicitly. 
119  IFC Performance Standard 8 (2012), para. 16. 
Laws 2015, 4 827 
 
 
research and could benefit from scientific advancements. It also allows for critically assessing whether 
benefit-sharing leads to non-discriminatory results, prioritizes the needs of the vulnerable, and factors 
in the need to protect against negative consequences of scientific research. In other words, this 
interpretation permits to consider the inter-linkages among all dimensions of the right to science. This 
interpretation also serves to identify possible shortcomings of benefit-sharing obligations under 
international biodiversity law. Critically, exploring a mutually supportive interpretation of fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing in light of the universality of the human right to science may serve to bring 
into sharper focus the challenges related to the production of global benefits that may derive from 
specific benefit-sharing obligations under international biodiversity law. Such a mutually supportive 
interpretation could thus help prevent the sidelining of broader human rights concerns when a logic of 
exchange may prevail in concrete benefit-sharing negotiations. This risk may be particularly high in 
private-law contractual negotiations in the context of bilateral benefit-sharing settings. 
Furthermore, the evolution of international biodiversity law on fair and equitable benefit-sharing 
also presents several opportunities for cross-fertilization with regard to the rights to traditional knowledge 
of indigenous peoples and local communities and the right to science. These opportunities concern the 
recognition of traditional knowledge on an equal basis with other systems of knowledge, the clarification 
of prior informed consent and benefit-sharing requirements for the commercial and non-commercial 
use of traditional knowledge in the areas of nature conservation, natural resource management and  
bio-based research, as well as the due diligence standards for business responsibility to respect 
indigenous peoples’ rights. A dialogue between international human rights and biodiversity lawyers in 
this regard may also serve to focus attention on less studied issues, such as the recognition of land 
tenure as an essential pre-condition for the protection and preservation of traditional knowledge. On all 
these issues, opportunities to ensure cross-compliance with the normative detail of international 
biodiversity law under international human rights monitoring processes are still to be explored. 
Finally, it is worth recalling that fair and equitable benefit-sharing under international biodiversity 
law is far from being fully operationalized. However, a significant amount of practical challenges have 
been identified and innovative approaches are being developed in sharing scientific information, 
supporting scientific cooperation, transferring technology and integrating traditional knowledge in 
multilateral science-policy processes, as forms of benefit-sharing, under international biodiversity law. 
These may provide insights into how a vague and optimistic concept can (and when it cannot) lead to 
tangible outcomes, which should be of interest to those exploring ways to implement the right to science. 
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